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A Policy-Oriented Framework for Understanding Violent
Extremism
Wael Haddara
Western University
Violent extremism represents a serious challenge to open and democratic societies. This article
presents a framework for understanding violent extremism in the context of “lone-wolf” attacks in
Western societies. The framework combines social, political, and psychological factors and
highlights the importance of integrating the available evidence from multiple disciplines to
develop cogent, effective policy. Specifically, in addition to a broad survey of motivational factors,
the article draws on terror management theory to provide insight into the interaction between
religiosity and violence.
Counterextremism programs are most successful at mitigating the risk of violence when they
are focused on behavior, rather than ideology, when they are community-based and funded, rather
than government-run, and when they are not seen to be attempts to control or marginalize Muslim
communities.
______________________________________________________________________________

Violent actions motivated by extremist beliefs constitute a relatively small threat to public safety
in the “West” when considered in a purely statistical or comparative context. Such actions,
however, have a disproportionate impact on individuals’ and communities’ sense of safety and
security. Political and media narratives surrounding them stoke the fear that “no one is safe,” that
everyone is a potential target, and that terror may be visited on any part of society by anyone at
any time. These narratives are reinforced by the rise of “lone-wolf” attacks that appear haphazard
and indiscriminate. The involvement of otherwise seemingly “normal” individuals in some of these
attacks further contributes to the narratives. The overall impact of these actions and the public
response to them is a reflexive push toward greater policing and securitization of society. While
right-wing and conservative politicians and policy makers have traditionally favored a policing
and securitization approach, over the past fifteen years since the events of September 11, 2001,
centrist and left-wing policy makers have also felt compelled to shift in a similar direction.
Because of this significant impact on policy and societal cohesion, an understanding of the
nature of the threat and how to most effectively counter it is needed. This article proposes a
psychosocial ecological framework to describe the elements involved in radicalization that may
allow for more coherent policy development. Though a full taxonomy of violent extremist
behavior is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to note that from a purely functional
perspective, there are several different manifestations of violent extremism, and the distinctions
among them are important for the purposes of public policy. This article addresses two
manifestations: the desire or willingness to perpetrate acts of violence outside of what would
normally be considered a theater of war or conflict zone and the desire to travel to a conflict zone
to participate in acts of violence. More specifically, this article considers violent extremism in the
context of individual Muslims.

Wael Haddara is an associate professor at the Schulich School of Medicine and Centre for Education Research and
Innovation, Western University, London, Ontario.
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The proposed framework is premised on several assumptions that are drawn from the scholarship
of violent extremism but that may be in contention in popular culture and political narratives. This
divergence between scholarly findings and political narratives is one of the obstacles to proposing
and developing effective policy recommendations.
The most salient assumptions about violent extremism are the following:
1. There is nothing unique about Islam or Muslims that drives the process of violent
extremism. This phenomenon is observed in other faiths and ideologies and other ethnic
and cultural groups. Violent extremism can best be examined as part of a continuum in
time and space rather than a unique phenomenon.1
2. There is no single path to violent extremism; nor are there infinite paths. The best approach
to understanding violent extremism is complex, nuanced, and multilayered. Hence,
effective public policy to counter violent extremism should be multimodal and nuanced
rather than simplistic and reductionist. Often the most public counterextremism efforts are
the least effective.
3. Combatting violent extremism as an isolated, disjointed exercise is difficult. Efforts are
needed at governmental and societal levels and at local, national, and international levels.
Nevertheless, in the absence of a comprehensive solution, focused efforts are necessary
and possible.
4. Language is important. I have used “violent extremism” and “countering extremism”
throughout rather than “radicalization.” Etymologically, radicalism is the notion that
change must be rooted in fundamental change in society. Radical political ideologies have
been the progenitors of many progressive policy changes. Since extremism means being
furthest away from the mainstream, we must acknowledge that the center does shift over
time. Victorians, for example, would likely consider twenty-first-century Anglo-Saxon
sexual mores to be extreme. Pacifism is one form of an extreme. We can debate whether
pacifists are a threat to national security in times of war, but we acknowledge that the threat
to our values, national interests, and security derives more from what individuals do rather
than abstain from doing.2 Hence violent extremism, not radicalism or extremist thought,
should be our target.
My five-point framework for understanding violent extremism is based on a review of the
literature and my interactions with at-risk individuals over the past several years. This framework
is intended to be partially compensatory. For an individual to become engaged in the planning or
execution of an act of violence, a minimum level of each of the five elements of the framework
must be satisfied. But different individuals may be defined by the extent to which each element is
foregrounded. To meet the challenge of violent extremism, public policy should address all five
elements: ideology, grievances, alternatives, resources and opportunity, and the extremist person.

The Framework
Ideology
At the heart of violent extremism is a set of beliefs, be they nationalistic, religious, or other.
Beyond these beliefs is the image of a utopian world toward which violent extremists strive.
Though detailing that utopian world is accomplished to varying degrees, all extremist ideologies
make clear that the existing world is not the utopian world, and there is no hope of its becoming
so without a violent confrontation. As an example in modern Islamic thought, Sayed Qutb
2
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presented such a utopian ideal, a fundamentally different position from that of Hasan al-Banna.
Al-Banna held that Egyptian society and the Egyptian state are fundamentally Islamic albeit
imperfect and in need of reform that can be brought about gradually. Qutb, in contrast, held that
society and the state are fundamentally un-Islamic and can be made Islamic only by upending the
current order.3 There are important reasons that ensured that most readers of Qutb neither espoused
violence nor held extremist views.4 Nonetheless, these utopian views became the ideological basis
for small violent groups in 1970s Egypt.
More recently, groups such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh have embraced what can be loosely
described as a “Salafist-jihadist” ideology.5 The defining feature of Salafism that makes violent
extremism possible is the emphasis on the Truth as One and Indivisible. Salafism, however, is not
a sufficient condition for violence. “Jihadism” has been used to refer to the idea that physical force
is the primary means through which change can be brought about and that other means, such as
preaching or societal reform, are secondary and can be employed only once force has succeeded.
The combination of Salafism and Jihadism can therefore give rise to a worldview in which
adherents have certainty that they hold the Truth and that they are compelled to use violence to
bring about the Truth. For many Muslims, however, the use of the term “jihad” to connote anything
other than the struggle to achieve self-purification or the justified use of violence within specific
boundaries is offensive.
This explication of the ideological position underlying violent extremism has an important
corollary. Because this ideology foregrounds violence as the means of bringing about Truth in this
world, the movement privileges the desire and the ability to plan and execute violent acts, rather
than piety, knowledge, or personal observance. And for those privileged few who are called to
serve the Cause of Truth, personal behavior in keeping with the tenets of Islam is desirable but not
necessary. Rather, moral superiority can be achieved, not through personal effort, but by believing
in violence as the path to establishing the Truth. Interviews with local recruits to the cause of Daesh
show them to have very little knowledge of Islamic tenets, of the Qur’an, hadith, or the history of
Islam.6 And in recently released documents, over 70 percent of recruits to Daesh describe
themselves as having only basic knowledge about even the basics of Islam.7
The profiles of many extremists reflect that dichotomy. Several of the individuals who
perpetrated the 9/11 attacks had a record of non-observance. Some were involved in extra- or
premarital sexual relationships; others frequented strip clubs. Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, who attacked
the Canadian Parliament in October 2014, was described as a drug-addicted petty felon.8 Brahim
Abdessalam, who blew himself up in Paris in November 2015, owned a bar. His brother, Salah,
was often seen with a beer in one hand and a joint in the other hand, approvingly watching Daesh
recruitment.9 Salah was also identified as a gay prostitute in the gay bars he frequented. Bouhlel,
the Nice attacker who mowed down people during Bastille Day celebrations last summer, was a
known womanizer.10
In short, for some, the allure of violent extremist ideology is its emphasis on whether one is
willing to approve of violence and engage in it, rather than undergo any kind of personal struggle
or journey through the faith. To paraphrase Adlai Stevenson, extremist ideologies make it easier
to die for one’s beliefs than to live up to them.
How does one combat the lure of an ideology that is so muscular and utopian? The current
approach has been for governments (Western and Middle Eastern) to encourage support for
scholars and ideologies likely to help achieve strategic objectives.11 The association of such efforts
with governments, however, has likely limited their appeal.
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Grievances
The second element necessary for an individual to morph into violent extremism is the existence
of a grievance or set of grievances.12 These can be political, economic, or social grievances, and
they may be local or national.13 Perhaps the most striking example is the lack of opportunities for
acceptance and upward mobility for young people of North African extraction growing up French
in France. In 2005, riots lasting nearly three weeks forced the declaration of a state of emergency
in parts of Paris. The trigger for the riots was the deaths of two young Frenchmen trying to escape
police interrogation about a break-in. The rioting seemed disproportionate to the instigating
incident and revealed a large fault line in the banlieues. These men, like other immigrants or
children of immigrants who grew up in the West, seem to belong nowhere.14 They are neither Arab
nor traditionally Muslim, nor are they fully integrated and accepted in their societies and countries
of birth and rearing. As in the more recent Black Lives Matter and the Idle No More protests,
another underlying reason for the riots seems to be social and economic disparity and the sense of
being a second-class citizen in one’s own country. Of note, according to a poll taken in 2014, 16
percent of all French citizens and 27 percent of those aged eighteen to twenty-four approve of
Daesh. Muslims, however, constitute only 5 to10 percent of the population of France. In other
words, support for Daesh extends well beyond French Muslims, even if one assumes that all French
Muslims approve of Daesh, an unlikely scenario.15 Similar, but less stark, are the numbers in the
United Kingdom, where 7 percent of respondents in a 2015 poll support Daesh, but only 4.5
percent of the population is Muslim.16 These numbers are significantly higher than favorability of
Daesh in Muslim majority countries.17
Grievances are most effective in this context when they are real and can be credibly advanced
as requiring action. On the international stage, the ongoing and worsening plight of Palestinians is
the classic example. The situation in Syria has now become another textbook example. As of fall
2016, for every Syrian killed by Daesh, eight have been killed by the Assad regime. Yet Daesh has
garnered military action and the greater share of attention from Western governments. Even now
with the devastating stories of refugees dying on beaches and in trucks, there is hardly a serious
discussion of the root cause of this massive dislocation and how to prevent it: dealing with the
brutal regime of Bashar El-Assad. Instead, Western governments focus on the extremism of the
Syrian rebels and the success of dismantling El-Assad’s chemical weapons regime, as if how
Syrians are killed matters to them more than living.18
In the domain of grievances is a considerable lack of shared understanding. Many Muslims
—irrespective of their ideological stance—view the world today as a place where Muslims are
under siege.19 This view is reflected in a change in the practice of imams. Imams traditionally pray
for “oppressed” or disadvantaged Muslims around the world at the end of their Friday sermon. But
now many have ceased to name a specific group lest they offend members of the congregation by
omitting a group with which they have strong emotional ties. Such groups are found in areas well
beyond the Middle East. The Rohingya in Burma, Muslims in the Central African Republic, and
the Uighurs in China have all recently joined the Palestinians, Somalis, Iraqis, Afghans, and now
Syrians on the list.
The mainstream narrative in North America and Europe, however, dismisses Muslim
grievances as the result of a victim complex or as a dysfunctional reaction to long-gone disparities
and injustices, such as colonialism. According to a popular right-wing narrative, the real reason
Muslims are involved in so many conflicts is that “something” about Islam or Muslims makes
Muslims incapable of or unwilling to peacefully co-exist with others.
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The issue, however, is not just personal suffering. Through case studies of assassins and lonewolf terrorists, Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko have identified two profiles of potential
lone-wolf terrorists: the “disconnected-disordered profile” and the “caring-consistency profile.”
The former refers to “individuals with a grievance and weapons experience who are socially
disconnected and stressed with a psychological disorder.” The latter refers to “individuals [who]
have . . . felt strongly the suffering of others and a personal responsibility to reduce or revenge
this suffering.”20
Alternatives
Grievances and ideology as drivers of violent extremism may be containable if individuals can
better their situation and resolve their grievances through credible alternatives to violence. The
presence of real alternatives for societal change allows individuals and groups to compete for the
hearts and minds of their fellow human beings by offering them their vision of a better society.
Alternatives to violence can, at least, greatly reduce the attraction of violence. But in the absence
of any such alternatives, violent extremism is seen as the only credible path to addressing
grievances and becomes attractive.
The Arab Spring provided a natural experiment to test this hypothesis. Between 2011 when
the Arab Spring took hold in Tunisia and Egypt and mid-2013 when the counterrevolution
prevailed in Egypt through a military coup, Tunisia through capitulation, and Libya through civil
war, the appeal and traction of Al-Qaeda appeared to decline.21
In the eighteen days of peaceful demonstration in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, “perceived unarmed
civil resistance delivered a heavy blow to Jihadism and significantly undermined its rationale (that
armed activism is the most effective and/or most legitimate tool for change).”22 By the end of
2012, “the perception of increasing irrelevance” had become “more pronounced.” “A core
argument of Al-Qaeda,” James J. F. Forest points out, “has been that corrupt, Western-backed
regimes can only be changed through the use of terrorist attacks to mobilize the ummah
[transnational Muslim community]. But in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, change has taken place
without any meaningful involvement whatsoever by Al-Qaeda. This, in essence, discredits AlQaeda’s ideology.”23
The Egyptian military coup of 2013 and subsequent support for the coup and for the military’s
repressiveness by European and U.S. government officials and pundits, however, had the opposite
effect. Because peaceful change had failed to bring about permanent change, proponents of the
2011 uprisings were open to charges of naiveté and failure to understand the “real” nature of the
conflict—that it is an existential conflict between Islam and the West in which force, rather than
peaceful resistance or electoral politics, presents the only real solution to myriad grievances.24 The
rise to power, in the United States, of a group of individuals who echo similar sentiments is hardly
encouraging.25
Resources and Opportunity
“Resources and opportunity” covers several criteria essential to the actualization of violent
extremism. These range from exposure to violent extremist recruiters—of Westerners drawn to
fight with Daesh, some 75 percent of whom are recruited by a family member or friend—to access
to the resources necessary to travel to Syria, Afghanistan, or Mali or to mount an attack at home.
The resources and opportunity necessary for lone-wolf attacks are very different from those
necessary for attacks by a violently extremist proto-state such as Daesh, and increasingly, lone
5
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wolfs are showing that acts of violent extremism can be mounted with minimal resources: a truck
can be as deadly as an automatic weapon or a bomb.
Law enforcement and security agencies face a dilemma about resources and opportunities in
developing strategies to deal with violent extremism. On one hand, do they wait until a lone wolf
or a group of people has accumulated resources and found the opportunity to commit violence
before acting? In an effort to avert disaster, can they legitimately “test” targets by providing them
with resources and opportunity, or is doing so a form of entrapment? On the other hand, how can
law enforcement and security agencies limit resources and opportunity without compromising the
openness of our societies by altering the free flow of goods and people? How can they do so and
still safeguard privacy and securitize societies?
The Extremist Person
At the heart of violent extremism is a person. The ultimate goal of “radicalization” research has
been to find a profile that security services can work from that that fits all extremists with 100
percent sensitivity and 100 percent specificity. Though no such universal profile exists, specific
profiles, such as that of the lone-wolf attacker or the person who travels overseas to join Daesh,
may be possible.
One of the tensions in the debate about violent extremism has been whether individuals who
perpetrate violent attacks such as New York 9/11 or London 7/7 are “real Muslims.” Muslims who
are not involved in such attacks argue that the perpetrators are not real Muslims, whereas the
perpetrators themselves often argue that they are. They may leave written or visual testimony in
which they identify Islam as their cause and motive. But then later a story emerges that reveals
how little actual commitment some perpetrators have to the tenets of Islam. In recent cases in
Canada, the United States, France, and Belgium, where lone-wolf attacks were planned or
executed, the individuals involved were revealed to have had significant struggles with drugs,
crime, sexuality or all three. Reports by security services in the United Kingdom reveal that a
religious Islamic upbringing tends to protect against engagement in violent extremism.26
How do we reconcile these findings? Terror management theory (TMT), which has roots in
existential philosophy, may provide an answer. TMT posits that since human beings are conscious
beings, they become conscious of their own mortality. Yet human beings have an innate desire to
live. The juxtaposition of the awareness of mortality and the desire to live can create potentially
paralyzing terror. To mitigate that terror, human beings engage in a variety of tactics. The proximal
defense against the existential terror of dying is to deny the possibility: I’m too young, I’m too
healthy, and so on. Those defenses succeed only to the extent that they allow one to avoid being
confronted with one’s own mortality. The more fundamental defense, however, is a belief in
immortality, symbolic or real. Real immortality is what faith systems promise: heaven and an
afterlife. Symbolic immortality lies in the belief that we will be remembered and that we will live
on the hearts of our fellow human beings, through our children or a legacy of some manner.
Immortality, real or symbolic, can mitigate the terror of mortality only if one has sufficient selfesteem—that is, if one believes that one has lived life in accordance with a values system that
promises immortality. Existential terror may ensue when one is confronted with the prospect of
dying but has not developed an effective belief in immortality or lacks the level of self-esteem to
believe that one is deserving of immortality.27 A corollary of TMT is that when confronted with
death, individuals will identify more tightly with their own worldview and denigrate other
worldviews. In a sense, a particular worldview can mitigate death-related anxiety only if it is true.
6
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The need to maintain that belief results in a tighter identification with one’s own worldview and
attacks on other, competing worldviews. In addition, in a postmodern world, threats to identity
may serve as surrogates for mortality salience, such that threats to cultural and religious identities
may instigate a hostile reaction to “others.”28
Individuals whose fund of religious knowledge is limited or who cannot draw on a fund of
spiritual enlightenment or an inclusive and uplifting community in the face of low self-esteem may
find that mortality salience drives them to acts of supreme self-redemption, such as imagined
martyrdom. And so, in the face of personal crises, such as marital breakdown and financial
problems, they may seek to regain their self-esteem through spectacular acts of terror.29
Daesh and troubled individuals use religion to establish an “us versus them” world. Punitive
security measures against all Muslims reinforce this binary vision. Populists such as Donald
Trump, Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, and others seem to be unaware of how they mirror the very
narrative they claim to be fighting. Their attacks may spur a generation of young Muslims into
approaching their faith, not as a path to spiritual and social fulfillment and enlightenment, but
rather as an extrinsic identity that helps them assert their place in a hostile world. In doing so they
play right into the hands of Daeshite narratives that reinforce what TMT studies warn against.
TMT, however, also provides promise for solutions to potential radicalization. Research
drawing on TMT has shown that intrinsic but not extrinsic religiosity mitigates anxiety induced
by mortality salience. In the face of reminders of their own mortality, faith can help people be at
peace with themselves and with those who hold a competing worldview when it is a part of who
they are, rather than only as part of a collective identity.30 And in other TMT studies, priming
subjects with positive verses from their holy texts, for example, “Do good to others because Allah
loves those who do good” (Qur’an, 28:77) or “Love your neighbor as yourself,” reduces hatred
and the tendency to lash out against others.31 These findings are a direct challenge to the profiling
effort. The definition of intrinsic religiosity as faith being an integral aspect of one’s being is likely
difficult without increasing personal observance, which some security-minded experts have
advanced as a red flag for violent extremism.
The Framework as a Whole
Among the many frameworks for progressions to violent extremism that have been advanced in
the literature,32 the framework presented here overlaps most closely with Moghaddam’s “staircase
to terrorism,” though it is distinct in several ways.33 It is nonprogressive and compensatory, and it
emphasizes behavior (resources and opportunity) rather than mindset. Each element is potentially
independent; individuals may be drawn to violent extremism through an overemphasis of one
element over the others. Identifying these elements can help shape policy directions for combating
violent extremism.34 Any group making evidence-informed policy recommendations, however,
faces challenges such as those described in the following section.

Challenges to Making Policy Recommendations
Defining “Extremism” and “Radicalization”
So far I have focused on specific aspects of violent extremism, defined earlier as “the desire or
willingness to perpetrate acts of violence outside of what would normally be considered a theater
of war or conflict zone and the desire to travel to a conflict zone to participate in acts of violence.”
7
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But violence is itself often an instrument of public policy, and government efforts to justify that
violence often necessitate a politicization of the discussion on violent extremism and
radicalization. This phenomenon is evident in the war on Daesh: foreign fighters who join Daesh
are identified as radicalized violent extremists, but those who join Kurdish groups fighting Daesh
are not.35 An oppressive government that “denies its citizens individual freedoms” can be
described as extremist “to the extent . . . that individual freedoms represent a valued norm.”36 Yet
neither state violence, particularly by allies of Western nations, nor oppression by regimes,
particularly when they are Western allies, is treated as an example of violent extremism. Clarity
of terms is important in the formulation of policy to avoid acting in opposition to liberal democratic
values and alienating communities whose help is crucial for this effort.37 By including “resources
and opportunity” as an essential feature of my framework, I am siding with those who argue that
policy makers should focus on violent extremism as behavior rather than as mindset.38 I believe
that making the distinction between behavior and mindset and focusing on behavior is important
if policies that oppose violent extremism are to avoid the counterproductive effect of targeting
Muslim communities, especially young men in those communities.39
Combatting Politicization of the Effort against Violent Extremism
The current effort against violent extremism is taking place against the background of increasing
nationalism and xenophobia and the rise of the so-called Alt-Right. Politicians on the right have
wielded the threat of violent extremism as a partisan political issue and have called for policies
that are clearly anti-liberal and ineffective, most notably using torture and banning Muslims from
entry into their countries.40 In response, centrist and left-wing politicians have sometimes found it
expedient to reaffirm their commitment to national security by adopting watered-down elements
of the same policies, contributing to an overall atmosphere of hysteria that has spilled over into
initiatives to fight violent extremism.41
Identifying the Metrics of Success
The rate of violent extremist incidents in the Western world is already very low. The glib
observation that more Americans die from lightning strikes than from terrorist attacks.42 raises the
question of what metric can be used to measure the success of policies to combat violent
extremism. A zero-incident outcome may not be possible, and the resources required to achieve
such an outcome will have a significant negative effect on society.
Policy Implications
Ideology
While necessary to the development of violent extremists, ideology is likely the lowest-yield
element identified in this framework as an aid to reducing violent extremism. As discussed earlier,
ideology in and of itself provides insufficient motivation for an individual to commit a violent
extremist act. Furthermore, an individual’s understanding of the ideological basis for violent
extremism is most often shallow and hence is not necessarily countered by another ideological
recasting of Islam.
Community-based efforts to counter ideology can sometimes be effective, while state-based
efforts tend to backfire and are fraught with problems.43 As Jennifer Hendrickson points out, a
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connection between ideological counternarratives and government “negatively impacts program
legitimacy.”44
The salient aspect of the ideology under discussion is not religion but the muscular,
purposefulness of the utopia promised by violent extremists. To counter the violent extremist allure
of purpose, we must offer a narrative that gives young people, particularly those at risk, a sense of
purpose. Scott Atran puts it bluntly: “When I hear another tired appeal to ‘moderate Islam,’ usually
from much older folk, I ask: Are you kidding? Don’t any of you have teenage children? When did
‘moderate’ anything have wide appeal for youth yearning for adventure, glory, and
significance?”45 Hence, the constant refrain from politicians that “Islam is a religion of peace” and
their attempts to foster forums that emphasize pacifism as a response to current crises are unlikely
to sway those gravitating to violent extremism. Rather, focusing on activities and programs that
give young people purpose and stature in their communities may have a far greater effect.
The constant regrets, denials, disavowals, and condemnations that Muslim communities issue
in response to various acts of terrorism may well appear to younger Muslims as defensiveness,
capitulation, and failure, further alienating them from community leaders and institutions. But
those reflexive responses are borne of decades of being targeted and demonized. Political leaders
and the media have an important role to play in producing a new discourse that redefines the
relationship between Muslim communities and the wider society when acts of terrorism are
perpetrated in terms other than security and policing.
Grievances
Grievances are central to the recruitment of individuals to violent extremist causes. And while the
complete elimination of grievances may be impossible, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
we are witness to a colossal failure of leadership across the world, in which the interests of large
groups of people, of nations are being sacrificed for short-term political interests.46 With an
unprecedented number of refugees in the world, we cannot pretend that all is well or trust that spin
and propaganda and ignoring the problem will make it go away. We are experiencing a vacuum of
leadership such that even the rhetoric of idealism has given way to expressions of xenophobia as
national policy.
This sentiment is not new. President Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed it in a speech at
Columbia University in 1950.
As friends of free people everywhere in the world, we can by our own example—
our conduct in every crisis, real or counterfeit; our resistance to propaganda and
passion; our readiness to seek adjustments and compromise of difference—we can
by our own example ceaselessly expand understanding among the nations. We must
never forget that international friendship is achieved through rumors ignored,
propaganda challenged and exposed; through patient loyalty to those who have
proved themselves worthy of it; through help freely given, where help is needed
and merited. In rights and in opportunity, in loyalty and in responsibility to ideals,
we are and must remain equal. Peace is more the product of our day-to-day living
than of a spectacular program intermittently executed.
The best foreign policy is to live our daily lives in honesty, decency and
integrity; at home, making our own land a more fitting habitation for free men; and
abroad, joining with those of like mind and heart, to make of the world a place
where all men can dwell in peace. Neither palsied by fear nor duped by dreams but
9
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strong in the rightness of our purpose, we can then place our case and cause before
the bar of world opinion—history’s final arbiter between nations.47
In the field of counterradicalization research, a similar appeal is occasionally made. In an indepth review of the literature, Schmid draws the following conclusions about counternarratives:
Credibility and legitimacy are core ingredients of any political narrative hoping to
catch the imagination of people at home and abroad. They are also key resources in
counter-radicalisation and CT [counterterrorism]. Governments need not be perfect
before they can effectively engage in successful counter-radicalisation efforts.
However, they have, in the eyes of domestic and foreign publics, to be markedly
better than extremist parties and terrorist organisations. Political leaders need to
stand on the moral high ground when it comes to fighting abuses of power, redress
injustices and address popular grievances. Wherever that can be achieved at least
in part, extremists and terrorists have, in the long run, no chance of success.48
Alternatives
Alternatives to violent extremism that can be offered at the local level must include programs that
help end discrimination and fight police abuse, that provide opportunities for youth employment,
and that empower young people, allowing them space to be agents, to be active, and to productively
discharge their energies. A fierce defense of democracy abroad is essential if we are to successfully
promote the narrative that peaceful change is possible and laudable. Support for autocrats must not
be the norm to protect trade or influence. Rather it must be seen as the exception dictated by
compelling pragmatic considerations and must be balanced with credible support for human rights.
Resources and Opportunity
Policies for countering violent extremism must take into account the tensions between the need for
policing and securitization and between protecting civil rights and not fostering a paranoid state.49
The Extremist Person
TMT framing raises important issues for Muslim communities and societies at large. On one hand,
it is clear that individuals with religious education and an intrinsic sense of religiosity are best
protected against violent extremism. On the other hand, some Western jurisdictions have a studied
resistance to Islamic education and practice. The framework described here would support the
notion that practices championed by French secularists likely increase the risk of violent extremism
by marginalizing religious education and instruction and pushing an identity-based, extrinsic
religiosity on young people. The TMT framework may explain in part the relative success of North
American Muslim communities compared with European Muslim communities. Leaders within
the Muslim community and in society at large must build a rhetorical framework that
contextualizes identity as the main driver of religiosity. Some converts may be drawn to Islam as
a communal identity rather than as a means to rediscovery of purpose and the meaning of the
human experiences. It is important to note that this does not mean an apolitical or apathetic
rendering of the faith but rather a focus on understanding Islam holistically. A focus on programs
10
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that advocate for a constructive, balanced understanding of Islam, though they currently exist in
many communities, may be even more necessary as a feature of the next phase of community
building. For many Muslim communities, however, funding is a problem and government funding
may be difficult or seen as suspect. The problem of funding might be rectified by encouraging
charitable foundations to fill the funding gap and to tackle issues of citizenship, inclusiveness,
tolerance, and acceptance. Efforts should be broad based and not focused only on Muslim
communities.

Conclusions
The fight against violent extremism cannot be successful if policies, programs, and initiatives are
subject to cynical political manipulation. Politicians are undoubtedly under great pressure to
prevent violent acts and to be seen working to prevent them. But the best approaches are
multifaceted and are directed to community building, youth empowerment, and improved societal
cohesiveness. Constant tirades against immigrants and the alleged threat of “Islamic terror” serve
no constructive purpose. They only exacerbate the differences within multicultural societies and
drive marginalized youths into the folds of those who promise to vindicate them against such
rhetoric. The Muslim community is not responsible for terrorism or for preventing it, but like all
other stakeholders, Muslim leaders may benefit from a re-evaluation of the current challenges to
construct better community education and awareness efforts.
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